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of the Congress in 1985-86 may simply suggest that the members of 
Congress are devising new rules for "counting" majorities and 
maintaining electoral support in the new fragmented politics. 
Constitutional adaptation and flexibility-even informal 
change-is above all a question of the will and inventiveness of indi-
viduals. It is, quite simply, a matter ofleadership. Men and women 
make government work, and they make constitutions work, too. By 
the same token, we are not apt to have much effective government 
with a President who does not like government, whether effective or 
not. Effective government in a democracy is at bottom a matter of 
organizing mass popular support behind public policy. For better 
or worse, American institutions of government are enormously re-
sponsive and sensitive to political opinion. That imperative tran-
scends even the institutional arrangements of the Constitution. 
GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE 
CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES 
OUR HISTORY. By Laurence H. Tribe.1 New York: Ran-
dom House. 1985. Pp. xii, 171. $17.95. 
Richard E. Morgan 2 
Few would deny that Laurence H. Tribe is one of the most 
sophisticated defenders of judicial activism writing today. This lit-
tle book is intended to convince the general reader that Ronald 
Reagan should not be allowed to place nominees of his choice on 
the Supreme Court without careful Senate inquiry into their views 
on contemporary constitutional issues. Fair enough. (Although 
one wonders whether Professor Tribe would be urging such vigi-
lance on the Senators if another administration were seeking doctri-
nal clones for Justice Brennan.) And Tribe develops an excellent 
case for close senatorial scrutiny of the "constitutional visions" of 
Supreme Court nominees. 
He begins by debunking the idea-which has wormed its way 
into the conventional wisdom of political scientists, historians, and 
other students of the Court over the past several decades-that 
Presidents cannot really do much to reshape the Supreme Court by 
nominating persons with views similar to their own. As Tribe effec-
tively demonstrates, this is, at best, a half-truth. 
1. Professor of Law, Harvard University. 
2. Professor of Government, Bowdoin College. 
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Many of the famous examples of Justices surprising the Presi-
dent who nominated them, turn out, on closer examination, to be 
examples of presidential inattention or yielding to short-term politi-
cal considerations. If James Madison, for instance, was surprised 
by Justice Story's commitment to Federalist principles, "he had 
only himself to blame, for most of Madison's [Democratic Republi-
can] party, including his mentor Thomas Jefferson, had warned him 
not to nominate Story for just this reason." And Woodrow Wilson, 
knowing James McReynolds's "conservative streak," wanted him 
out of the Cabinet so much that he kicked him upstairs, where 
McReynolds "spent twenty-six years voting against everything 
Woodrow Wilson stood for, and compiling a record as perhaps the 
most reactionary and certainly the most obnoxious man who ever 
served on the Court." 
To the list of errors by inattention out of expediency may be 
added the two great Eisenhower blunders (Earl Warren and 
William Brennan), and Gerald Ford's nomination of John Paul 
Stevens. To restore the prestige of a Justice Department tained by 
Watergate and the intelligence scandals, Ford sought out Edward 
Levi, Dean of the University Chicago Law School and a man held 
in the highest esteem by American's legal elite. Levi did, indeed, 
help raise morale and return the Department and the FBI to re-
spectability, but his politics were markedly left of Ford's. Even 
though Justice Douglas's resignation could not have taken the 
White House altogether by surprise, the President's men were intel-
lectually unprepared. Under pressure for a noncontroversial, "con-
sensus" nomination to advance their unelected President's themes 
of "healing" and "bringing together," the White House deferred to 
Levi (even though he was not one of them politically), and the At-
torney General produced a distinguished Chicago practitioner and 
former Wiley Rutledge clerk with virtually no public track record 
on constitutional issues. That Stevens's performance must often 
disappoint Gerald Ford and those who were his closest advisors is 
nobody's fault but their own. 
On the other side, Tribe marshals impressive examples of intel-
lectually effective nominating strategies. Washington and Adams 
managed to put in place a nationalist majority that survived three 
decades into the nineteenth century. Jackson created a majority 
that would champion state banks over the hated Second Bank of the 
United States in Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky.3 Lincoln, having five 
nominations to work with, was rewarded by a majority that ac-
cepted the legal theories on which his conduct of the Civil War was 
3. 36 U.S. (II Pet.) 257 (1837). 
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based, "even those most constitutionally suspect". And, in the ex-
ample of examples, Franklin D. Roosevelt created a Court in his 
own name. It jettisoned dual federalism, and the bad, old substan-
tive due process of "liberty of contract," and debouched into a new 
doctrinal territory of enhanced protection for human (nonproperty) 
rights. 
It took F.D.R. six years to remake the Supreme Court completely. But it was 
the nomination power, and not the Court-packing plan, that did the job. . .. 
[W]hen the opportunity to make appointments to the Court does arise, the prospect 
for constitutional changes of far-ranging impact should never be underestimated. 
Against this background Professor Tribe makes the further im-
portant point that the Supreme Court Justices should come to the 
bench with ideas about what the Constitution means, and that the 
Senators (and the rest of us) are properly concerned with what these 
ideas are. 
The Supreme Court has room neither for Justices who are afraid to defend 
their ideas nor for those who have no ideas. After all, by the time of nomination, a 
would-be Justice ought to have opinions and convictions on the full range of topics 
of constitutional importance. A blank slate is not the sign of an open mind, but of 
an empty one--of immaturity and inexperience, and perhaps even of indifference. 
Seeking promises or precise commitments during the confirmation 
process is, of course, both offensive and counterproductive-"lit-
mus tests are a poor method of investigating a candidate's substan-
tive constitutional philosophy". But Tribe concludes that "the 
range of opinion among judges, scholars, and lawyers on supposedly 
settled issues of constitutional law is so broad that outer limits need 
to be set considerably short of the absurd." Thus chapter six is 
entitled "Policing the Outer Limits," and is divided into sections in 
which the Senators are urged to probe "the nominee's vision of 
what the Constitution means," and "the nominee's view of the 
Supreme Court's role." 
All this makes such good sense that this reviewer is embold-
ened to undertake an experiment-to consider how, on the evidence 
of the substantive constitutional arguments presented in this book, 
Professor Tribe himself might shape up as a nominee. Is his consti-
tutional vision within the "outer limits"? The stakes are very high, 
as Tribe is at pains to remind us, and so the inquiry is not only fair, 
it powerfully suggests itself. 
There is, first, something curious about many of the particular 
cases Professor Tribe chooses to make his general point about the 
Supreme Court's recent contributions to the quality of American 
civilization. Whatever position one takes on the vexed question of 
state regulation of abortions, simple candor requires the recognition 
1986] BOOK REVIEW 447 
that Roe v. Wade was a massively controversial decision (second 
only, perhaps, to Dred Scott) and that it continues to be so. A dubi-
ous contribution to say the least. Or consider Kolender v. Lawson,4 
which stripped California police of the power to require identifica-
tion of suspicious persons on the streets. Does Professor Tribe re-
ally suppose that the vast majority of his countrymen regard such 
conduct as a grievous intrusion into personal privacy? Does he see 
an aggressively asserted anonymity in the fact of reasonable police 
inquiry as a contribution to the quality of life in late twentieth 
century America? Again and again Tribe's choice of positive out-
comes appears perverse in the light of what we can learn of majority 
preferences.s 
Furthermore, there are some instances in which the treatment 
of cases is not as scrupulous as one might wish. Meyer v. Nebraska6 
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 1 for instance, are presented as exam-
ples of the "ultraconservative Court of the early twentieth century" 
upholding "rights of free speech and free exercise of religion." As 
Philip Kurland demonstrated more than twenty years ago they are 
nothing of the kind.s Rather, the opinions by the despised Justice 
McReynolds were based squarely on liberty of contract (the bad, 
old substantive due process), which Professor Tribe elsewhere 
deplores. 
But these are quibbles. The genius of the Court is its capacity 
to stand against majority sentiment when necessary, and it is likely 
that Meyer and Pierce would be decided on different grounds if 
heard today. Such things do not place a nominee beyond the "outer 
limits." What does, perhaps, is Tribe's conception of the Supreme 
Court's role in the American governmental system. Of Roe v. 
Wade, Tribe writes that "if the Supreme Court had refused to hear 
Roe at all, it would have effectively delegated the fate of mother and 
unborn child alike to shifting political majorities in the fifty state 
legislatures." The choice of verb is crucial. Certainly the Court's 
refusal would have left the question of abortion to the state legisla-
tures. It would have left it there because that is where our historical 
constitutional arrangements placed it. To say that the Supreme 
Court's refusal to withdraw something from the control of the states 
is a "delegation" is tantamount to saying that there are no authori-
4. 461 u.s. 352 (1983). 
5. H. MCCLOSKY & A. BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS 
BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES (1983). 
6. 262 u.s. 390 (1923). 
7. 268 u.s. 510 (1925). 
8. P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 26-31 (1961). 
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tative decisions about the structure of American government before 
the Supreme Court acts. 
And, for Tribe, this is only the beginning. Do adults have the 
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment? Who makes such 
decisions for children or comatose patients? Who should be 
deemed competent to choose between life and death for those not 
competent to make the decision themselves? Should it be a family 
decision? Should it be in the hands of experts-physicians or hospi-
tal commitees? We learn that "the Supreme Court, as the final arbi-
ter of the Constitution's meaning, cannot long avoid these issues." 
Professor Tribe does appear ready to allow elected officials to have a 
crack at these questions first, but the outcomes there will then be 
reviewed by the Court to see if they square with "fundamental 
values." 
Indeed, Laurence Tribe appears to live in a devouring present 
of pressing moral issues where what counts is never who decides but 
only whether the decision is the right one. And by this view of the 
American system of government, the Court, as guardian of funda-
mental values, is at the apex of the system, policing the wisdom of 
the other, inevitably subordinate, structures. Not only is this a vi-
sion that would be unrecognized to the framers of the Constitution, 
it would have been unrecognizable to any politically literate Ameri-
can before 1960 or so. 
Further, consider Professor Tribe's obscurantist view of our 
substantive constitutional heritage. After suggesting that it will be 
up to the Supreme Court to act as "playwright and director" of 
American politics, deciding "which roles will be played by whom," 
which decisions will be made by government and which by the pri-
vate sector, which by lawmakers and which by private persons, he 
proceeds to announce that "[h]owever decisions like these are to be 
made, no conscientious student of the Constitution and its framing 
can pretend that more than a few of them have already been made 
for us by those who wrote and ratified the Constitution of the 
United States." Within the confines of a book review it is not open 
to me to explore all the ways in which this statement is misleading. 
In fact, a serious student of the Constitution, while never supposing 
that any decisions have been "made for us" by the framers, will find 
a wealth of relevant guidance on contemporary questions in the his-
tory of the framing and subsequent interpretation of the Constitu-
tion. The serious student will find himself powerfully moved 
toward certain answers while others are forbidden him. What is 
important here, is that Tribe makes no serious effort to support his 
statement. It is naked assertion. One searches in vain in this book 
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for any real address by Professor Tribe to the framing or the 
thought of the framers. Indeed, the same thing is true when the 
search is expanded to Professor Tribe's scholarly work as repre-
sented in Constitutional Choices. 
This carelessness toward history and tradition leads us to a fi-
nal troubling aspect of Laurence Tribe's constitutional vision-his 
argument that interpretation of the Constitution is impossible. In-
tention cannot guide judges in the way Federalist No. 78 insists it 
can-not only because the thought of the framers is largely irrele-
vant to the issues of our time, not only because there are differences 
in theme and emphasis within the literature of our framing and con-
stitutional development, but because interpretation is inherently im-
possible. (Annoyingly, Tribe insists on referring to interpretivism 
as "strict constructionism." "Strict constructionism" is either Jef-
ferson's approach to reading the necessary and proper clause, or 
Richard Nixon's term for interpretivism. As used by Tribe it is 
either mistaken or a low blow.) 
Consider the following: "The central flaw of strict construc-
tionism is that words are inherently indeterminate-they can often 
be given more than one plausible meaning." The two parts of the 
sentence will not keep house together. To say that a word may be 
given more than one plausible meaning is not to say that the word is 
indeterminate. Words may and do have multiple meanings and nu-
ances. But within the rhetorical conventions of a particular period, 
it is often perfectly possible to establish core meanings and demon-
strate why plausibility sharply declines as an interpreter attempts to 
move away from the core meaning toward strained, peripheral 
meanings that may be more congenial to him as policy. The point is 
that some ways of reading the Constitution have binding force be-
cause they capture accurately what it was that the framers and suc-
cessor generations were about; they draw legitimacy from the terms 
of our basic intergenerational political compact. Other versions of 
the same language only pretended to such legitimacy because they 
rest on relatively less plausible constructions of the words. 
Of course there are always close and arguable cases; but recog-
nizing that is very different from Professor Tribe's pose of studied 
agnosticism toward history and toward language. All choices, he is 
telling us, are inevitably subjective, and legitimacy is not derived 
from who makes the decision and how (the matters to which consti-
tutions are principally addressed). Nor are decisions justified or 
necessarily explained in terms of the traditions and the prior agree-
ment of our people (because that is an impossible enterprise). 
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Rather they are justified by their being made correctly in reference 
to necessarily nebulous "fundamental values." 
To Tribe's credit, there is no flinching. In Constitutional 
Choices he writes that "I find all legitimating theories not simply 
amusing in their pretensions but, in the end, as dangerous as they 
are unconvincing."9 Since a Constitution is, at the simplest level, a 
set of legitimating procedures embodying a legitimating theory, it 
becomes clear that Professor Tribe's quarrel is not really with inter-
pretivists, and not even with the Constitution of the United States, 
but with the basic ideas of constitutionalism and majority rule. 
What does one make of a distinguished constitutional lawyer 
who doubts the possibility of constitutionalism, and whose core 
commitment seems to be to a radical subjectivism? Professor Tribe 
protests that his position does not amount to "a policy of 'anything 
goes'", but he never succeeds in explaining why it does not-in-
deed, he makes little effort to do so. 
One hopes that a conscientious Senator, instructed by this 
book and confronted by such a nominee, would vote against 
confirmation. 
CONSERVATIVES IN COURT. By Lee Epstein.1 Knox-
ville, Tenn.: University of Tennessee Press. 1985. Pp. xii, 
204. $17.95. 
Alan B. Morrison 2 
I began reading this book with some apprehensions. The 
works listed on the back cover as "of related interest" suggested a 
substantial possibility of a conservative bias, at least on the pub-
lisher's part, and the title page indicated that the book was funded 
in part by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, which is known to 
be supportive of conservative organizations. I was concerned that 
the book would be a paean to the conservative movement and that it 
would fail to take a hard look at what was occurring in these orga-
nizations. I was nonetheless hopeful that it would provide substan-
tial new data about these organizations-how they operate, what 
they are doing, how they are financed, and how their success can be 
measured by some objective standard. 
9. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 6 (1985). 
I. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Southern Methodist University. 
2. Mr. Morrison is the Director of the Public Citizen Litigation Group in Washington, 
D.C., which Ms. Epstein refers to as a "liberal" organization. 
